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Introduction
Motivation
• Since its inception in 1929, the Institutional Revolutionary Party
(PRI) has held power over most of Mexico.
• Held the presidency until 2000
• Had majority in congress until 1997
• The PRI’s regime made use of client-patron relations
• Strong ties to the party, but not ideological
• Expectation of receiving/maintaining private goods or job
• Machine politics began to decline giving way to technocratic
governments (Ward 1998)
• Opposition parties had a chance to prove their worth
• However, all parties are said to engage in clientelist practices
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• Machines use a mix of strategies (Gans-Morse, Mazzuca, & Nichter
2014)
• Patronage: distribution of public goods (Stokes 2011)
• Public officials may experience preferential treatment from media
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Theory
• Party in power has access to government resources






Increase in “machine politics”:
• Clientelism
• Media advantage
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Hypotheses
• H1: If a party (the PRI) has the mayor in a municipality, their
presidential vote in that municipality will be larger than it would be
otherwise. This is the clientelist effect.
• H2: The clientelist effect will decline over time.
• H3: The higher the level of deprivation in a municipality, the larger
the clientelist effect.
• H4: The clientelist effect will be larger for the PRI than for the PAN
and the PRD.
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Data and Methods
Data
• Presidential vote at the municipality level (IFE 2012)
• 4 elections: 1994, 2000, 2006, 2012
• 692 municipalities; 20 states
• Index of deprivation (CONAPO 1995-2010)
• Access to water, sewage, and healthcare
• % of population with basic education
• Mayor’s party
• Governor’s party







Increase in “machine politics”:
• Clientelism
• Media advantage
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Controlling for Partisanship
• “Normal” vote share as a substitute for partisanship
• Normal vote = vote share in a municipality without clientelism
• Regress vote of municipalities that have experienced turnover
• Predict normal vote for all municipalities
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Models
• Mixed models with random slopes for main independent variable
• Model 1:
VoteSharekji = β0+β1Mayor+θ[Years]∗Mayor+λ[Years]+β2NormalVote
+µk + µkj + qkj ∗ Mayor + ϵkji(1)
• Model 2:
VoteSharekji = β0+β1Mayor+θ[DeprIndex]∗Mayor+λ[DeprIndex]+
β2NormalVote + β3ElectionYear + µk + µkj + qkj ∗ Mayor + ϵkji(2)
Andrews Research Conference 10
Models
• We are interested in the effect of having the mayor
• So, we need to look at the implied coefficients
• Model 1:
VoteSharekji = (β1+θ[Years]+qkj)∗Mayor+λ[Years]+β2NormalVote
+(β0 + µk + µkj) + ϵkji(3)
• Model 2:
VoteSharekji = (β1 + θ[DeprIndex] + qkj) ∗ Mayor + λ[DeprIndex] +
β2NormalVote + β3ElectionYear + (β0 + µk + µkj) + ϵkji(4)
Andrews Research Conference 11
Results
Results - Model 1
(1) (2) (3)
PRI PAN PRD
Party has mayor 4.594*** (0.87) 3.656** (1.13) 10.27*** (2.57)
Mayor X 2000 0.809 (1.03) 4.075** (1.35) -7.402** (2.73)
Mayor X 2006 -2.956** (1.01) 1.437 (1.31) -3.988 (2.68)
Mayor X 2012 -5.694*** (1.01) -1.893 (1.30) -6.650* (2.74)
Constant 24.41*** (2.22) 1.002 (0.86) 5.168*** (1.00)
sd(Mun. X Mayor)
Constant 2.502** (0.80) 3.506*** (0.85) 1.298 (2.21)
Standard errors in parentheses
Note: Baseline is for year 1994. 2,742 observations.
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Election Year
For a municipality in Morelos. 95% confidence intervals.
PRI
The Clientelist Effect on Presidential Vote
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Results - Model 2
(1) (2) (3)
PRI PAN PRD
Party has mayor 1.272 (0.71) 3.327*** (0.94) 3.825** (1.34)
Mayor X Low -1.188 (0.88) -1.825 (1.17) 0.0495 (1.62)
Mayor X Medium 0.835 (0.88) 0.628 (1.17) -0.330 (1.64)
Mayor X High 4.647*** (1.08) 6.850*** (1.45) 6.556*** (1.96)
Mayor X Very high 4.544** (1.66) 7.064** (2.30) 3.855 (2.85)
Constant 3.759*** (0.98) 0.535 (1.03) -0.384 (0.59)
sd(Mun. X Mayor)
Constant 1.410 (0.38) 1.545 (1.76) 0.820 (0.57)
Standard errors in parentheses
Note: Baseline is for municipality with a very low level of deprivation. 2,742 observations.
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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The Clientelist Effect on Presidential Vote
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What about H4? - Clientelist effect for PAN and PRD
(1) (2) (3)
PRI PAN PRD
Party has mayor 4.594*** (0.87) 3.656** (1.13) 10.27*** (2.57)
Mayor X 2000 0.809 (1.03) 4.075** (1.35) -7.402** (2.73)
Mayor X 2006 -2.956** (1.01) 1.437 (1.31) -3.988 (2.68)
Mayor X 2012 -5.694*** (1.01) -1.893 (1.30) -6.650* (2.74)
Constant 24.41*** (2.22) 1.002 (0.86) 5.168*** (1.00)
sd(Mun. X Mayor)
Constant 2.502** (0.80) 3.506*** (0.85) 1.298 (2.21)
Standard errors in parentheses
Note: Baseline is for year 1994. 2,742 observations.
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Andrews Research Conference 21



























Clientelist Effect in % Points
Distribution of Random Effects of the Clientelist Effect
Andrews Research Conference 22



















Very low Low Medium High Very high
Level of Deprivation
For a municipality in Morelos. 95% confidence intervals.
PAN
The Clientelist Effect on Presidential Vote
Andrews Research Conference 23



















Very low Low Medium High Very high
Level of Deprivation
For a municipality in Morelos. 95% confidence intervals.
PRD
The Clientelist Effect on Presidential Vote
Andrews Research Conference 24


























The Clientelist Effect on Presidential Vote
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Clientelist Effect in % Points
Levels of deprivation: 1 − Very low, 2 − Low, 3 − Medium, 4 − High, 5 − Very high
Distribution of Random Effects of the Clientelist Effect
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Conclusion
Conclusion
• May be capturing not only a clientelist effect, but a mayoral
advantage more broadly
• This may be a result of the measure of NormalVote
• There is a significant mayoral advantage for all parties
• Larger for the PAN and PRD
• For the PRI it may be a clientelist advantage that has been in decline
• Further research:
• Explore the relevance of municipality- vs. state-level politics for
presidential elections (builds on Ames 1994 & Magar 2012)
• Study the interactions between municipality and state executive
power
• Create a better control for NormalVote using previous congressional
vote
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The 2018 Presidential Election
Implications for 2018
• The PRI has seen its mayoral advantage decline
• Faces great reputational costs
• Opposition parties can benefit from this
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Nov-17 Jan-18 Mar-18 May-18
Month
López Obrador (MORENA) Anaya (PAN-PRD) Meade (PRI)
Zavala (IND) Rodríguez (IND)
Graph shows 90% confidence intervals around the estimates. Source: Oraculus.
Poll of Polls - Vote Intention
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Questions?
Andrews Research Conference 29
Robustness
(1) (2)
PRI share PRI share
Party has mayor 4.594*** (0.87) 4.626*** (0.87)
Mayor X 2000 0.809 (1.03) 0.765 (1.03)
Mayor X 2006 -2.956** (1.01) -3.122** (1.01)
Mayor X 2012 -5.694*** (1.01) -5.754*** (1.01)
Party has governor 1.263** (0.42)
Constant 24.41*** (2.22) 22.70*** (2.21)
sd(Mun. X Mayor)
Constant 2.502** (0.80) 2.625** (0.78)
Standard errors in parentheses
Note: Baseline is for year 1994. 2,742 observations.




PRI share PRI share
Party has mayor 1.272 (0.71) 1.069 (0.72)
Mayor X Low -1.188 (0.88) -1.110 (0.88)
Mayor X Medium 0.835 (0.88) 1.007 (0.88)
Mayor X High 4.647*** (1.08) 4.901*** (1.08)
Mayor X Very high 4.544** (1.66) 4.867** (1.67)
Party has governor 1.139** (0.40)
Constant 3.759*** (0.98) 3.713*** (0.97)
sd(Mun. X Mayor)
Constant 1.410 (0.38) 1.411 (0.38)
Standard errors in parentheses
Note: Baseline is for municipality with a very low level of deprivation. 2,742 observations.
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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